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APPEAL AND ERROR-INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS IN CODE STATES.-
The appellants brought an appeal from an order overruling a demurrer. Held,
that such An order was interlocutory and not final and that the appeal be dis-
missed. Trebbin v. Thoeresy (1925) 316 Ill. 3o.
At common law appeal was unknown and final judgments of inferior courts
were brought under review by writ of error. Coke, Littleton, *288; Ex parte
Henderson (1855) 6 Fla. 279. And a writ of certiorari served to bring ques-
tions of the jurisdiction of the lower court under review. -Davis, The Remedy
of Certiorari (igol) I CoL. L. REv. 419. In general, under the modern codes
appeal is allowed only from final judgments or orders. Alaska Sts. 1913, sec.
1338; Conn. Gen. Sts. I918, ch. 299, sec. 582o; Utah Comp. Laws, 1917, ch.
45, sec. 699o. But exceptions are made in most codes and an appeal is allowed
from interlocutory judgments or orders which determine the merits of the case.
Ariz. Civ. Code, 1913, sec. 1227 (2); Ark. Digest of Sts. 1921, ch. 42, sec.
2129; Ia. Code, 1924, ch. 555, sec. 12823; Kan. Laws, 1915, ch. 93, sec. 7469;
Mo. Rev. Sts. 1919, ch. 12, sec. 1469; Minn. Gen. Sts. 1913, ch. 8o, sec. 8oor;
Nev. Rev. Laws, 1912, sec. 4833; N. M. Session Laws, 1915, ch. 77, sec. I;
N. C. Comp. Sts. 1919, ch. 12, sec. 638; N. D. Comp. Laws, 1913, ch. 15, sec.
7832; Okla. Comp. Sts., 1921, -ch. 3, sec. 780; Or. Laws, 192o, ch. 5, sec.
548; Porto Rico Rev. Laws, 1911, sec. 6409; S. D. Rev. Code, 1919, sec. 3168;
Wash. Comp. Sts., 1922, sec. 1716; Wyo. Comp. Sts. 1920, ch. 390, sec. 6369.
Other codes accomplish the same results by saying that any judgment or order
which determines the rights of the parties or the merits 'of the case is "final" and
since "final" may be appealed from. Neb. Comp. Sts. 1922, sec. 9127, 9128, 9137;
Ohio Gen. Code, 1924, sec. 12250, 12258. In five codes appeal is restricted to
P. few enumerated interlocutory orders. Calif. Code of Civ. Proc., 1923, sec.
c63 (2) (actions to redeem real or personal property from mortgage or lien,
actions of partitions and decrees of divorce); Burns, Ind. Sts., 1914, 1392
(I5) (orders for execution or delivery of written instruments); Idaho, Comp.
Sts., i919, ch. 262, sec. 7152 (order for partitions of real property); Mont,
Rev. Code, 1921, ch. 56, sec. 9732 (order for partition of real property);
Carrol's Ky. Code, 1919, sec. 734 (title to land). New York grants unusually
extensive privileges of appeal from interlocutory orders to the Appellate Divi-
sion and also to the Court of Appeals at the discretion of the Appellate Division.
N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act, sec. 611, 588 (3). The instant case is an example
of the refusal of the common law states to allow appeal from interlocutory
judgments or orders. Hurd's Ill. Rev. Sts., 1919, ch. iio, sec. 9r; Beznret v.
Clemence (1862) 85 Mass. 431 (no appeal from a demurrer); Hirsch v.
Hirsch (1917, Pa.) 66 Super. Ct. 54. But see McFarlan v. Doak (1916, Pa.)
63 Super. Ct. 27 (demurrer held final).
ARBITRATION AND AwARD--IisCONDUCT OF ARBITRAToR-PERsONAL INVESTI-
GATION WITHOUT NOTICE TO PARTiES.-In a dispute between a seller and a
buyer, arising from the latter's refusal to accept the goods, the arbitrator,
after the hearing, gave samples of the goods to his salesmen who reported
that the trade refused to accept them. It appeared that the arbitrator made his
award largely on the basis of this report. The award was for that reason
vacated in Special Term. From a judgment of the Appellate Division revers-
ing that order the plaintiff appeals. Held, that the judgment of the Appellate
Division be reversed. Stefano Berizzi Co. v. Krausz (1925) 239 N. Y. 315.
[905]
906 YALE LAW JOURNAL
By statute in New York an award may be set aside where the arbitrator is
guilty of fraud, partiality or other misconduct. N. Y. C. P. A. par. 1457 (3).
The instant case holds that where the arbitrator, without notice to the parties,
augments his expert knowledge by a personal verification after the hearing
he is guilty of misconduct. If the effect of this holding be to restrict the per-
sonal investigation of the arbitrator, it seems unfortunate. For the arbitrator
is generally selected for his technical knowledge. See Cobb v. Dolphin Co.
(1888) io8 N. Y. 463, 468, 15 N. E. 438, 441; Sturges, Covwercial Arbitration
(1925) 34 YALE LAw JoURNAL, 48o, 497. And any addition to that knowl-
edge made before the appointment would therefore make him more desirable
as an arbitrator: That such additions made after his appointment should make
his award void sems hardly reasonable. But if the effect be merely to re-
quire notice it still seems inconsistent with the fundamental theory of an arbi-
tration. The court siated as its reasons that the fundamental rules of a trial
were not adhered to, that cross-examination was not permitted on the informa-
tion obtained, and that therefore the arbitrator though admittedly bona fide may
have been misinformed. It is generally conceded that strict rules of evidence and
procedure are not applicable to an arbitration. Fudickar v. Guardian Ins. Co.
(1875) 62 N. Y. 392; Gerdetz v. Central Oregon Ins. Co. (917) 83 Or. 576,
163 P ac. 98o; Wheat Export Co. v. New Century Co. (I919, Ist Dept.) 185
App. Div. 723, 173- N. Y. Supp. 679. Letters and reports are frequently
admitted without cross-examination. Whitney v. Church (1917) 91 Oonn.
684, 1O Atl. 329; Sturges, loc. cit. The only prejudicial effect of refusing
such cross-examination would be the possible presence of error in the arbitrator's
conception of the evidence. It is consistently held that a mistake of judgment
or error of fact or law does not invalidate an award. Reager's Adinx. v. Penn.
Co. (1916) 169 Ky. 479, 184 S. W. 395; Gerdetz v. Central Oregon Ins. Co.
supra. Nor do the New York precedents seem controlling. The court cites
no case since the Arbitration Act of ig2o. Of the New York cases cited only
one is directly in point. National Bank v. Darragh (1883, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 30
Hun, 29. The others are distinguishable in that in each the arbitrator gave
a hearing to one party in the absence of the other. Fudickar v. Guardian Ins.
Co., supra (dictnn); Knowlton v. Mickles (1859, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 29 Barb. 465.
'On the other hand the courts have expressly recognized a presumption in favor
of an award in spite of conduct fatal to a legal judgment. Perkins v. Giles
(1872) 50 N. Y. 228, 235; Hano v. Blanchard Co. (1922, ist Dept.) ig N.
Y. Supp. 227. Since it places an inconsistent limitation upon the conduct of
the arbitrator and necessitates a reversal though no error in the findings or
award is even alleged, and since it tends to stereotype the commercial arbitra-
tion proceedings to the structure of the present day court trial in the particular
of cross-examination, the decision in the instant case seems regrettable.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS-MAY A PErTiONEE
APPEAL?-The New York City Bar Association under a statute petitioned
the Appellate Division to punish an attorney for misconduct. Disbarment was
recommended by a referee but the court dismissed the action, and the Bar
Association appealed.. Held, that the appeal be dismissed since the petitioner
was not a party to the action. In re Dolphin (925, N. Y. Court of Appeals)
73 N. Y. L. JouR. 295.
A proceeding to discipline an attorney is neither a civil suit nor a criminal
one, but is an action by the court to protect itself. See In re Bowman (1879)
7 Mo. App. 567, 569. By common law the court may of its own motion institute
the investigation. In re Mills (1850) i Mich. 392; In re Orton (1882) 54 Wis.
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379, 1i N. W. 584. In general, by statute any individual may petition the
court to act. In re Burchard (i882, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 27 Hun, 429; see
Matter of Brewster (1877, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 12 Hun, iog. But almost univer-
sally and in line with the instant case, such petitioner has no right that 
the
lower court act on the petition and has no control over the proceeding. 
In
re Peck (I914) 88 Conn. 447, 91 Atl. 274; Boston Bar Assoc. v. Casey (1912)
211 Mass. 187, 97 N. E. 751. And hence is not entitled to appeal. Brooks 
v.
Fleming (1873) 65 Tenn. 331; coittra: Vernon Co. Bar Assoc. v. McKibben
(1913) 153 Wis. 350, 41 N. W. 283 (but now changed by 
statute). The
fact that the action is named "Bar Assoc. v. Doe" is immaterial. Boston
Bar Assoc. v. Casey, supra, at p. 193, 97 N. E. at p. 754. It has been argued,
however, that once the motion is entertained by the court, the petitioner 
is
entitled to" a proper judgment on the facts. See the dissent of Freeman, J.,
in Brooks v. Fleming, supra, at p. 338. If the attorney is disciplined by 
the
lower court, he may appeal. Matter of Robinson (1913) 209 N. Y. 354. The
standing of the Bar Association in court in the principal case is like 
that of
a person who under a statute reports a delinquent taxpayer and prosecutes 
at
the discretion of the Tax Commission. N. Y. Cons. Laws, 1923, ch. 
61, see.
202. In at least one state a Bar Association is now entitled by statute 
to have
its petition heard by the state Supreme Court. Wash. Comp. Sts. 
1922, sec.
139, subd. I8.
BANKS AND BANKING-REMITTANCE OF MONEY-RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR NEG-
LIGENCE oF CORRESPONDENT BANx.-In 1917 the defendant on 
payment by the
plaintiff of a sum of money agreed to effect a deposit of rubles in a 
Russian
bank. Its correspondent in Petrograd duly acknowledged receipt of 
instruc-
tions to make the deposit. But no information as to whether a deposit was 
made
could be secured. The plaintiff sought to recover the amount paid. A verdict 
was
directed for the defendant Held, that the judgment be affirmed since the defend-
ant's duty was complete on its selection of a suitable agent for whose 
negli-
gence or default it was not responsible. Skopetz v. American Express 
Co.
(1925, Mass.) 146 N. E. 262.
Under the "Massachusetts rule" the duty of. a bank receiving commercial
paper for collection is to "seasonably transmit the same to a . . .
suitable
agency." Fabens v. Mercantile Bank (1839, Mass.) 23 Pick. 33o; Hoffman v.
Mechanics-Anerican Bank (i923) 211 Mo. App. 643, 249 S. W. i68. The
courts adopting this doctrine have applied it, as in the instant case, to a 
remit-
tance of money. Spira v. Eisen (1922) 15 Ohio App. 511; Nicoletti v. Bank
of Los Banos (923) 19o Calif. 637, 214 Pac. 5I; COMMENTS (1924) 12 CALIF.
L. REv. 2o9. But in New York the bank of deposit for collection is responsible
for the default or negligence of its correspondent. Allen v. Merchants 
Bank
(1839, N. Y.) 22 Wend. 215; Isler v. Nat. Park Bank (1925) 239 N. Y. 462;
(925) 34 YALE LAw JOURNAY, 323. And, consistently, the remittance 
cases seem
to indicate a similar result. See Safian v. Irving Nat. Bank (192I, Sup. Ct
App. T.) 116 Misc. 647, 65o, I9o N. Y. Supp. 532, 534; Richard v. Credit Suisse
(i924, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 124 Misc. 3, 14, 2o6 N. Y. Supp. i5o, i6o; but see
Katz v. Western Union Tel. Co. (1922, Sup. Ct. App. T.) iig Misc. 489, 196
N. Y. Supp. 556. There is an attempt in both situations to determine 
the
unexpressed intention of the parties. Thus, the "Massachusetts rule" for 
col-
lection presumes an intent from a general custom among merchants and bankers,
and this prevails in the absence of a special agreement. Fabens v. Mercantile
Bank, supra$ Wilson v. Carlinville Bank (i9oo) 187 Ill. 222, 58 N. 
E. 250.
But it does not necessarily follow from the custom as to collection 
that the
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same understanding exists in regard to remittance. It is submitted that in the
latter case the common understanding is not that the bank will merely send instruc-
tions to some foreign agency, but will "see that the thing is done." See dissent
of Seawell, J., in Nicoletti v. Bank of Los Banos, supra. Relief for the banks
may lie in an express agreement limiting responsibility. Sommer v. Taylor
(ig2o, Mun. Ct.) 19o N. Y. Supp. 153; Alemian v. American Express Co. (1921)
237 Mass. 58o, 13o N. E. 253. Or an increased rate may be charged to cover
this del credere function.
CHAMPERTY AND MAINTENANcE-ATTORNEY AND CLIENT NOT IN PARI
DELICTo.-The defendant had contracted with the plaintiff to act as plaintiff's
counsel in a suit involving'title to the latter's land and to pay the expenses. of the
suit. Upon its successful termination, the defendant was to be entitled to collect
the rent under a lease to be made of the land, and to retain one-half thereof
in payment for his services and expenditures. The plaintiff had judgment, the
lease was made, and the defendant collected the rent and paid one-half thereof to
the plaintiff, in accordance with the contract. The plaintiff now seeks to recover
the moneys retained by the defendant on the ground that the contract was champer-
tons under the statute. From judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant appealed.
Held, that the plaintiff recover the sums in question less the reasonable value of
the defendant's services and disbursements. Rogers v. Samples (1925, Ky.) 268
S. W. 799.
Where the making of certain kinds of contracts is deemed to be prohibited
as a protection to one of the parties thereto, such party will not be regarded
as in pari delicto so as to preclude his recovery on the contract. Thus usury
statutes are deemed to be in protection of the borrower. Scott v. Leary (1871)
34 Md. 389; see Brozwning v. Moris (1778, K. B.) Cowp. 790. But generally
this doctrine has not been applied to champertous contracts, the law leaving
the parties as it finds them. State v. Sims (1881) 76 Ind. 328; see Reese v.
Resburg (igoo, ist Dept.) 54 App. Div. 378, 66 N. Y. Supp. 633. And although
the weight of authority is contra, a few American cases have even allowed
third party defendants to plead champerty between the plaintiff and his counsel
as a defense to an otherwise valid claim. Blixt v. Janowiak (1922) 177 Wis.
175, 188 N. W. 89; contra: Burnes v. Scott (1886) 117 U. S. 582, 6 Sup. Ct.
865; Hilton v. Woods (1867) L. R. 4 Eq. 432. The ancient statutes against
champerty were directed against abuses peculiar to feudal England. Winfield,
History of Conspiracy and Abutse of Legal Procedure (1921) parsin. The
present law, in great measure a mere survival, finds social justification in the
irotection of necessitous clients from greedy counsel. Accordingly the rule
of Scott v. Leary, supra, has been applied to permit a client to recover moneys
paid counsel under such contracts. Belding v. Smythe (1885) 138 Mass. 530;
cf. Irwin v. Curie (19o2) 171 N. Y. 4o9, 64 N. E. 161, reversing (ipoo, 2d Dept.)
56 App. Div. 514, 67 N. Y. Supp. 38o. And though the attorney gets no con-
tractual rights, he has frequently been allowed recovery on a quantum ineruit.
Watkins v. Sedberry (1923) 261 U. S. 571, 43 Sup. Ct. 4II; contra: Roller
v. Murray (1911) 112 Va. 780, 72 S. E. 665. The instant case accords with a
well-defined modern trend of giving protection to the client without penalty
to the attorney.
-CODE PLEADING-THEORY OF THE PLEADINGS-MALICIOUS PROSECUTION VERSUS
FALSE IMPRISONmENT.-The plaintiff, a school teacher, was in the habit of com-
pelling the pupils to sweep the school room. The defendant asked that his child
be excused because of illness. Upon the plaintiff's refusal, the defendant caused
her arrest for violating a criminal statute against the employment of children
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under fourteen during school hours. Upon discharge of the plaintiff she brought
an action for malicious prosecution. From a judgment for the plaintiff, the
defendant appealed on the ground that the complaint stated a cause of action in
false imprisonment, not in malicious prosecution. Held, that the judgment be
affirmed. Nelson v. Hill (1924, N. M.) 232 Pac. 526.
The distinctions between false imprisonment and malicious prosecution at
common law developed largely from the historic distinctions between trespass and
case. The direct injury which was the gist of the former action required trespass;
the indirect injury in the latter, an action on the case. See Kramer v. Lott (865)
50 Pa. 495, 498. Wherever the arresting officer acted under, valid process, 
the
arrest was viewed as the act of the state, and case for malicious prosecution was
the proper remedy against the instigator. Sheppard v. Furniss (851) 19 Ala.
760. Under modern codes with their single form of civil action any discussion
as to what form of action will lie for direct and indirect injuries seems distinctly
inapropos. Clark, The Code Cause of Action (1924) 33 YALE LAv JouRNAT,
817. The real question is: under what circumstances is the defendant responsible
for an unfounded arrest or prosecution? Where the prosecutor has complied with
the formal requirements of the law in procuring arrest and subsequent prosecu-
tion, he is not responsible unless he has acted with malice and want of probable
cause. Finney v. Zingale (1918) 82 W. Va. 422, 95 S. E. 1O46. Where there is
no attempt to meet such requirements the elements of malice and want of probable
cause need not be proved. Knickerbocker Steamboat Co. v. Cusack (19o5,
C. C. A. 2d) 172 Fed. 358; (1914) 27 HARv. L. Rsv. 487. Where the prosecutor
has attempted to meet the formal requirements of the law, but where through no
fault of his they are not, in fact, met, most courts impose responsibility only if
malice and want of probable cause are shown. Langford v. B. & A. R. R. (1887)
144 Mass. 431, 11 N. E. 697; Utz v. Mayes (1925, Mo.) 267 S. W. 59; contra:
Krause v. Spiegel (1892) 94 Calif. 37o, 29 Pac. 707. Such was the situation in
the instant case. The plaintiff had proved malice and want of probable cause;
but it was argued because the warrant was defective on its face and the arresting
officer's act therefore not the act of the state but of the defendant, that only
trespass for false imprisonment would lie. The court held that malicious prosecu-
tion would lie on the facts stated-a proper enough result; but to state it in terms
of common law procedure seems under a code a needless befogging of the purely
substantive question involved.
CONSTiTuTIoNAL LAw-DUE PROCEss-CMPLfLSoRY AanT boN.-Mandamus
proceedings to enforce an order of the Kansas Industrial Court were instituted
in the Supreme Court of Kansas. The order fixed wages, regulated hours of
labor, and prescribed working conditions. The United States Supreme Court
declared fixing of wages unconstitutional and on rehearing the order was modified
to compel obedience as to hours of labor. The defendant appealed alleging
infringement of the liberty of contract and rights of property guaranteed by the
"due process" clause of the i4 th Amendment. Held, that the judgment be
reversed. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations (1925, U. S.)
45 Sup. Ct. 441.
The result in the instant case was foreshadowed by the judgment on the original
appeal. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations (1923) 262 U. S.
522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630. See COMMENTS (1923) 33 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 196;
COMMENTS (1923) 22 MIcH. L. REV. 135; COMMENTS (1923) 12 CALIn. L. REv.
35. See generally, Vance, The Kansas Court of Industrial Relations uith its
Background (1921) 30 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 456; Rabinowitz, The Kansas
Industrial Court Act (1923) 12 CAIF. L. REkv. i; Simpson, Constitutional Limi-
Jations on Comtpulsory Industrial Arbitration (i925) 38 HARV. L. REv. 753. See
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.also Brown, The Separation of Powers in British Jurisdictions (1921) 31 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 24, 33; Brown, The Judidal Regulation of Industrial Conditions
(1918) 27 ibid. 427. It is to be regretted, however, that the Supreme Court should
thus cut off social experimentation "in the insulated chambers afforded by the
several states." See Holmes, J., dissenting, in Truax v. Corrigan (1921) 257
U. S. 312, 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, 134.
DESCENT AND DIsTRmUTIouN-NEPnPwS AND NIEcEs TAKE PER SnaPs.-
Nephews and nieces, children of predeceased half-sisters of the intestate, were the
nearest relatives, and a decree directed distribution to them as representatives of
their deceased parents. Held, that the decree be affirmed. Appeal of Messler
(1924, N. J. Ch.) 127 Atl. 85.
The common law knew only the per stirpes rule. The civil law allowed repre-
sentation ad infinitum in the direct descending line, but limited it in the collateral
line to persons of unequal degree. 2 Blackstone, Conmmentaries, *217, *517.
Persons in equal degree to the intestate under statutes of distribution usually take
equal shares in their own right, and those of unequal degree take per stirpes. 2
ibid. *517; 2 Kent, Commentaries, *425; Hasse v. Morison (1924) 11o Ohio
153, 143 N. E. 551 (collateral); In re Martin's Estate (i924, Vt.) i2o Atl. 862
(lineal) ; contra: i Swift's System (1795) 282. But see i Woerner, American
Law of Administration (3d ed. 1923) 217, note. Representation of collaterals
further than by children of the intestate's brothers and sisters is prohibited under
the English statute of distributions. Carter v. Crawley (1681, K. B.) T. Raym.
496; 2 Williams, Executors (nith ed. 1921) 1251. It has been held in Louisiana
that representation takes place ad infinitum in the collateral line. Succession of
Jacobs (1911) 129 La. 432, 56 So. 358. Some cases allow nephews and nieces to
take per stirpes. Cook v. Catlin (1856) 25 Conn. 387; Iglehart v. Holt (1898)
12 App. D. C. 68; Welch v. Wheelock (igog) 242 Ill. 38a, go N. E. 295. In
North Carolina, personalty was distributed to the next of kin in equal degrees
per capita. -Ellis v. Harrison (19o6) 14o N. C. 444, 53 S. E. 299.. And realty
per stirpes. Haynes v. Johnson (1859) 58 N. C. 124. In Minnesota the
statute was construed to allow nephews and nieces to take per capita. Staubitz v.
Lambert (1897) 71 Minn. 11, 73 N. W. 511. A change in the statute caused the
court to invoke the per stirpes rule. Swenson v. Lewison (1916) 135 Minn. 145,
i6o N. W. 253. But the legislature again changed the statute and the court
returned to the former rule. In re Fretheim's Estate (1923) 156 Minn. 366, 194
N. W. 766. The per capita rule was applied in Wagner v. Sharp (1881) 33 N. J.
Eq. 52o; Dickinson, Probate Court Practice in; New Jersey (1884) 161. In the
instant case, the court relied upon an amendment to the statute (N. J. P. L. 1918,
179) as signifying a legislative intent contrary to the previous New Jersey
decisions. This seems not a necessary construction and an unfortunate departure
from tle more easily applied per capita rule.
EASEMENTs-EFFECT OF CHANGE OF LocATIOI ON AcQpuisTIoN By PREscail-
TION.-The plaintiff claimed a right of way by prescription over the defendant's
land. There was proof that the location of the way had been changed several
times within the statutory period. The lower court gave judgment for the
plaintiff on the ground that a'change of way by the owner of the servient estate
acquiesced in by the dominant did not affect the prescriptive right. Held, that
the judgment be affirmed. Davis v. Wilkinson (1924, Va.) a125 S. E. 7oo.
The extent and nature of an easement acquired by prescription is measured
by the extent and mode of user. 2 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. i92o) 1344,
2o69; see American Bank Note Co. v. New York Elevated Co. (i89i) 129 N.
Y. 252, 266, 29 N. E. 302, 305. To determine the extent of a right of way, the
RECENT CASE NOTES
line of travel must therefore be substantially defined. Clark v. Paquette (1894)
66 Vt. 386, 29 Atl. 370; Montana Ore Co. v. Butte Mining Co. (9Oi) 25 Mont.
427, 65 Pac. 42o. Rambling crossings not limited to a particular direction,
though repeated for the statutory period, will never ripen into a prescriptive
right. Johnson v. Lewis (1885) 47 Ark. 66, 2 S. W. 329; Hoyt v. Kennedy
(898) 170 Mass. 54, 48 N. E. 1O73. But where, without fault of the dominant
owner, the way becomes impassable, temporary deviations are of no effect.
Cheney v. O'Brien (i886) 69 Calif. i99, io Pac. 479; Kurtz v. Hoke (1896) 172
Pa. I65, 33 Atl. 549. Otherwise, the claimant of the way cannot of his own
volition alter the location. Follendore v. Thonua (1893) 93 Ga. 300, 2o S. E.
329; Bushey ,. Santiff (1895, Sup. Ct. 4th Dept) 86 Hun, 384, 33 N. Y. Supp.
473. A way acquired by grant or necessity may be changed by an executed
parol agreement of the parties or by acts of one and the acquiescence of the
other. Davidson v. Kretz (1914) 127 Minn. 313, 149 N. W. 652; Hurst v. Bray-
ton (1921) 43 . I. 378, II3 AUt. 4. As in the instant case, most courts apply
the same rule to a way claimed by adverse user even though the change of
location occurred within the statutory period. List v. Jacoby (igoi) 22 Ky.
L. R. 1757, 61 S. W. 355; Berkey v. Milling Co. (I916) 194 Mich. 234, i6o N.
W. 648. This similarity between a way by grant with all the legal relations
complete and the claim to a prescriptive way with the legal relations yet inchoate
is not of itself objectionable, but the doctrine as a whole may be criticized on
the ground that a parol agreement, which involves the extinguishment of the
old and the creation of a new easement, is within the Statute of Frauds. See
Nichols v. Peck (I898) 70 Conn. 439, 442, 39 AUt. 803; 2 Tiffany, op. cit. 1339.
The same criticism, however, applies to the universal rule permitting the parol
abandonment of an easement. See NoTEs (1gI) 1I CoL. L. REV. 777.
EVIDENcE-UTTERANCE OF THIRD PERsoN NOT ADMISSIBLE TO Fix TIME WHEN
IT INCLUDES PREJUDICIAL HEARSAY.-In proceedings to probate a will it was
material to determine whether all the attesting witnesses were present at the
time the will was signed. A witness testified that he had seen the testator and
Steadman, one of the attesting witnesses, enter and leave, an interview unac-
companied by the other attesting witnesses. In order-to fix this interview as the
one at which the will was signed the lower court permitted the witness to repeat
a statement, made to him by Steadman immediately after the said interview, that
a will had been signed. Held, that a new trial be granted. Carpenter v. Carpen-
ter (1925, R. I.) 128 AUt. 223.
An utterance which without reference to its truth serves to mark a time or' a
place is not hearsay and is admissible. Angell v. Rosenbury (1864) 12 Mich.
24i; Parris v. Jenkins (1845, S. C.) 2 Rich. io6. For it is as properly reportable
as any non-verbal act of the third party. 3 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923)
sec. 1791. But it may not be given weight to establish the truth of the matter
asserted since for that purpose it is hearsay. - I Wigmore, op. cit. sec. 418. In
order to prevent giving such weight to it some courts have refused to allow the
specific tenor of the utterance to be stated. Rogers v. State (1919) 17 Ala. App.
175, 83 So. 359; Agudino v. R. Co. (1899) 21 R. I. 263, 43 Atl. 63. And have
held that the witness must describe the utterance without directly quoting the
prejudicial hearsay. Detroit & M. R. R. v. Van Steinberg (i868) 17 Mich. 99.
But in the instant case the statement was entirely irrelevant unless the truth of
its content was granted. It seems inevitable that it should have been considered
for its truth, and it appears (at p. 225) that it was so used. If, then, the wisdom
of the hearsay rule be admitted, the decision in the instant case, that the evidence
should have been entirely excluded, is highly commendable in that it prevents the
admission of hearsay under the guise of evidence to fix time or place.
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EVIDENE-WITNESSES-"NEW YORK RUL.E" AS TO EXHAUSTION OF PRESENT
RECOLLECTION BEFORE ADmiSSION OF PAST RECOLLiCrION REcoRDED.-On the trial
of an indictment charging defendants with presenting an immoral drama, one of
the defendants offered in evidence a transcript of the play, testifying that it was
copied by his secretary and compared "word for word." It was excluded upon
an objection for which no ground was stated. On appeal from a judgment
rendered upon a verdict convicting the defendants of a violation of section ii4o-a
of the Penal Law, it was sought to sustain the exclusion on the ground that the
recollection of the witness as to the contents of the transcript should have been
exhausted before the writing could be admitted. Held, (two judges dissenting)
that the exclusion was error, judgment reversed and a new trial ordered. People
v. Weinberger (1925) 239 N. Y. 307, 146 N. E. 434.
According to the "New York rule" it is error to admit past recollection
recorded until it has been shown that the present recollection of the witness is
exhausted. Natioial Ulster Co. Bank v. Madden (1889) 114 N. Y. 280, 21 N. E.
408. While followed in a few other jurisdictions this minority rule has been
criticized. See 2 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) sec. 738. The instant case
raises the question as to whether the "New York rule" is now to be considered
discarded only in cases like the instant one, where present recollection is a practi-
cal impossibility, or whether the rule is to be considered as abandoned entirely.
(1925) 25 Coi. L. RIZv. 498.
INJUNCTION-JURISDICTION OF EQUITY TO ENJIN FOREIGN PROCEEDINGs.-The
plaintiff, a foreign corporation, was sued successively in Washington and Minne-
sota on a cause of action, the facts of which arose in Washington. It prayed
for an injunction against the prosecution of the suit in Minnesota. In view of
the great inconvenience and expense of transporting witnesses and in view of
the apparent intent merely to vex, the trial court granted the injunction. Held,
that the decree be affirmed. Northern Pac. R. R. v. Richey & Gilbert Co. (1925,
Wash.) 232 Pac. 355.
The power of a court of equity to enjoin the prosecution of legal proceedings
in other jurisdictions is well-settled, since the physical power of the court is
directed against the individual and not against the foreign court itself. Lord
Portarlngton. v. Soulby (1834, Ch.) 3 Myl. & K. 1O4; Dehon v. Foster (I86i,
Mass.) 4 Allen, 545. Such injunctions do not violate the "full faith and credit"
or the "privileges and immunities" clauses of the Federal Constitution. Cole v.
Cunningham (1889) 133 U. S. lO7, IO Sup. Ct. 269. But there is a difference of
opinion about giving recognition to' the injunction in the foreign jurisdiction.
Thus, though the facts constituting the cause of action arose in the state issu-
ing the injunction, the foreign court still entertained the action. Bossng v.
District Ct. of Hennepin Co. (1918) 140 Minn. 494, 168 N. W. 589; contra:
Fisher v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1916) 112 Miss. 30, 72 So. 846; see I A. L. R.
148, note. Formerly the tendency was to refuse the injunction out of respect for
the foreign tribunal. Mead v. Merritt (1831, N. Y. Ci.) 2 -Paige, 4o2. But
latterly this power has been used more freely: as when the suit is brought to
vex or annoy. Claflin v. Hamlin (1881, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 62 How. Prac. 284;
see io Ann. Cas. 26, note. Or in evasion of domestic law where some well
defined policy is involved such as exemptions. Mumper v. Wilson (1887) 72
Iowa, 163, 33 N. W. 449; see 25 L. R. A. (N. s.) 267, note Or, as in recent
extensions, in an attempt to evade any rule of law. Weaver v. Ala. Great So.
R. R. (1917) 2oo Ala. 432, 76 So. 364; Culp v. Butler (1919) 69 Ind. App. 668,
122 N. E. 684; contra: Wells Lumber Co. v. Menominee River Boom Co. (1918)
203 Mich. 14, 168 N. W. Ioii; see (1920) 33 HARV. L. REv. 425. Likewise,
divorce proceedings have been enjoined. Borda v. Borda (1922) 44 R. I. 337,
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117 Atl. 362. Added expense, 'alone, is properly held an insufficient ground for
interference since every suit outside the state involves thfis element. Ill. Life Ins.
Co. v. Prentiss (1917) 277 IIl. 383, I15 N. E. 554 But where the expense is exces-
sive with no valid reason for the foreign suit, an inference of an intent to vex
is justified and the injunction should issue. Wabash Ry. v. Peterson (1919)
187 Iowa, 1331, 175 N. W. 523. The decision in the instant case, then, seems
sound, especially since the cause of action arose within the state.
INSURANCE-MEANING OF TEM "THEFT""IN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICY.-
The plaintiff insured his automobile in the defendant company against "theft,
robbery or pilferage." A garage owner, with whom the plaintiff left his car for
repairs, wrongfully used it for personal purposes, and returned it in a damaged
condition. The plaintiff sought reimbursement for loss by theft. A statute pro-
vided that one taking a car for his own benefit without the consent of the owner
"is guilty of larceny." N. Y. Cons. Laws, i9og, ch. 40, sec. 1293-a. The lower
court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, construing "theft" as including this form
of statutory larceny. Held, that the judgment be reversed. Van, Vechten v.
American Eagle Fire Insurance Co. (1925) 239 N. Y. 303, 146 N. E. 432.
In order to constitute theft within the scope of the policy there must be an
intent permanently to deprive the owner of his property. Phocnix Assurance Co.
v. Eppstein (1917) 73 Fla. 991, 75 So. 537. Some courts assert that the plaintiff
must prove all the elements of common law larceny. See Weir v. Central National
Fire Ins. Co. (1922) 194 Iowa, 446, 189 N. W. 794; Ledvinka v. Home Ins. Co.
(1921) 139 Md. 434, 115 Atl. 596. The decision in the instant case accords with
the weight of authority in holding that the meaning of "theft' in the policy is
the popular conception of the word. Hill v. North River Ins. Co. (1922) 111
Kan. 225, 207 Pac. 2o5 (obtaining automobile by false pretenses is not larceny in
Kansas, but held theft according to the notions of the ordinary person, and so
within a theft policy).
LANDLORD AND TENANT-DISTINCTION BErWEEN SUBLEASES AND ASSIGNMENTS-
The lessee of the Schulte Realty Co. assigned its lease to the plaintiff, the lease
containing the stipulation that if bankruptcy proceedings should be instituted
by or against the tenant, the landlord was to have the power to terminate the
lease at three days' notice. The plaintiff then transferred in the form of a
sublease the remainder of his term to the defendant, at an increased rental and
also reserving the power of re-entry for the breaking of a condition. Subse-
quently the plaintiff went bankrupt and the defendant vacated the premises upon
the serving of notice by the Schulte Co. The plaintiff sued for the rent, con-
tending his insolvency did not create in the Schulte Co. the power to terminate
the lease. Held, (two judges dissenting) inter alia, in giving judgment for the
plaintiff, that the transfer from the plaintiff to the defendant was an assignment,
and not a sublease, thus cutting off the plaintiff's responsibility for rent to the
Schulte Co. Gillette Bros., Inc. v. Aristocrat Restaurant, Inc. (1924, N. Y.) 145
N. E. 748.
The old common law requirement, originating under the feudal system, of the
existence of a reversionary interest to constitute the relation of landlord and
tenant still persists as the basis for the distinction between an assignment and
a sublease. Cf. Stewart v. Long Island R. R. (I886) lO2 N. Y. 6oi, 617; 8 N. E.
2oo, 2o6; I Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant (ist ed. 1912) sec. i5I; (1924) 8
MINN. L. REv. 6og. Hence a transfer by the lessee of a term less than his own
operates as a sublease. Geer v. Zinc Co. (19o7) 126 Mo. App. 173, 103 S. W.
I5I; (i92o) 2o COL. L. Rv. 95. But where the lessee parts with his entire term
in the premises, there is an assignment. Craig v. Summers (1891) 47 Minn.
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18g, 49 N. W. 742; (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 568. Even though the full
term in only part of the premises is conveyed. Bancroft v. Vizard (1919) 202
Ala. 618, 81 So. 56o; Cook v. Jones (1894) 96 Ky. 283, 28 S. W. 96o. Just
what constitutes a reversionary interest has been a matter of some uncertainty
and the retention of the minutest term, such as one day, has been held to satisfy
this requisite. Davis v. Morris (1867) 36 N. Y. 569; cf. Phelan v. Kennedy(igig, ist Dept.) 185 App. Div. 749, 173 N. Y. Supp. 687. .But the reservation
of a power of re-entry is not sufficient. Sexton v. Chicago Storage Co. (1889)
129 I1. 318, 21 N. E. 920; Herzig v. Blumnenkrohn (19o7, Ist Dept.) 122 App.
Div. 756, io7 N. Y. Supp. 57o; i Wood, Landlord and Tenant (2d ed. 1888) i8o;
contra: Dunlap v. Bullard (1881) 131 Mass. 161; Essex Lunch v. Boston Lunch(1918) 229 Mass. 557, 118 N. E. 899. Nor is a reservation of the rent to the
transferor. Taylor v. Marshall (1912) 255 Ill. 545, 99 N. E. 638; Sexton v.
Chicago Storage Co. supra; contra: United States v. Hickey (1872, U. S.) 17
Wall. 9 (a sublease as between lessee and transferee); McClaren v. Oil & Gas
Co. (9oo) 14 Pa. Super. 167. And that the transfer purports to be a sublease
is immaterial. Taylor v. Marshall, supra. The rule of thumb is desirable as
being easy of application. On the other hand it involves within itself a trouble-
some problem as to what constitutes a reversionary interest. Some courts have
disregarded this arbitrary rule and have with apparent soundness looked to the
intentions of the parties in determining whether an assignment or a sublease
has been created, at least in cases between the lessee and his transferee. Frith
v. Wright (1915, Tex. Civ. App.) 173 S. W. 453; see Stewart v,. Long Island
R. R., supra, at p. 6o8; Darling, Is a Sublease for the Residue of a Lessee's
Term in effect an Assignment? (1882) 16 Am. L. REv. 16. But as, according to
the view of the transaction taken by the court, the Schulte Co. has been injured
neither as to its purse, the plaintiff's 'assignor still being responsible for the
rent, nor its premises, the plaintiff-bankrupt not being an occupant, the result
in the instant case seems fair.
LIEL-REsPoNsmirLrY WHERE A DEFAMATORY STATEMENT TRUE OF ONE
PERsoN Is ALso APPLicAELE TO TEE PLAINTIFF.-One Harry P. L. Kennedy, a
Detroit attorney, was arrested on a charge of forgery, and brought to Washington,
D. C., for trial. The defendant newspaper published an account of the arrest of
"Harry Kennedy, an attorney, 4o years old." The description was correct, but
omitted the initials "P. L." Harry F. Kennedy, 37 years old, and the only lawyer
in Washington by that name, sued for libel. Held, a libel of the plaintiff.
Washingfon Post Co. v. Kennedy (1925, App. D. C.) 3 Fed. (2d) 207.
Defamation is one of the few remaining cases of absolute responsibility in the
law of tort. Want of malice is no defense. Shepheard v. Whitaker (1875)
L. R. IO C. P. 502; Bower, Code of Actionabl Defamation (igo8) 271; (1918)
27 YALE LAiv JoURNAL, 7O. Nor is want of negligence. Smith, Jones v. Hul-
ton: Three Conflicting Judicial Views as to a Question of Defamation (1912)
6o U. PA. L. REv. 365, 372; Laudati v. Stea (19= ) 44 R. I. 303, 117 At. 422;
contra: Butler v. News-Leader Co. (19o5) 1O4 Va. I, 51 S. E. 213. But one
supposed limitation has been asserted obiter that when a statement is true of the
person of whom it was in fact intended, its incidental applicability to other
persons will not give the latter causes of action. See Farley v. Evening Chron-
icle Publishing Co. (i9o5) 113 Mo. App. 216, 231, 87 S. W. 565, 570; Farwell,
L. J., in Jones v. Hulton [1gog] 2 K. B. 444, 479. The instant case refuses to
recognize even this supposed limitation though perhaps the result may be justi-
fied by the defendant's omission of further details descriptive of the personintended which were already within its knowledge, and which would have pre-
vented a libel of the plaintiff.
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LiUITATIoN OF ACTIONS-PAYMENT TO JOINT HOLDER OF NoT OF His SEARE
HELD NoT To TOLL STATUTE AS TO UNPAm HOLDER.-A promissory note made to
X and Y as joint payees was barred by the statute of limitations. The makers
of the note, however, settled with X for his specific share, and Y now sues to
recover his share, claiming that payment to X revived the entire note. A
demurrer in the lower court was sustained, and the plaintiff appealed. Held,
that the decision be affirmed. McKennon v. McKennon (1924, Okla.) 231
Pac. 91.
At common law part payment by one joint debtor took the case out of the
statute of limitations as to his co-obligor on the theory of an agency between
the parties. Whitcomb v. Whiting (1781, K. B.) Doug. 652. But the harsh-
ness of such a rule led to a change by statute in England. (856) ig & :o Vict.
c. 97, sec. I4; see Read vi. Price [i9o9] I K. B. 577. And, likewise, the rule has
been generally repudiated in the United States, it being said that there is not
sufficient privity to impJy an agency. Kollenback v. Dickinson (isi) ioo Ill.
427 (judicial decision) ; Monidah Trust v. Kemper (ipio) 44 Mont. i, II8 Pac.
8II (statute); Ann. Cas. 1912 D, 1326, note. In the instant case which presents
a converse set of facts, the court said there was no reason why the same "prin-
ciple of law should not govern" in the two types of cases, apparently ignoring
completely the underlying theory. For as between joint obligees there is, with-
out doubt, sufficient privity for a general payment to one on a joint debt to
revive the debt as to the other. Krause v. Spurgeon (1923, Mo.) 256 S. W.
io72; see 25 L. P, A. (N. s.) 8o5, note. And the question really raised would
seem to be whether or not there was an intention to acknowledge the entire
debt. For partial payment suspends the statute of limitations only because it
is looked upon as an acknowledgment by the debtor, from which a promise to
pay the remainder may be implied. Engel v. Browun (1897) 69 N. H. 183, 45
Atl. 4o2; Ruhl v. Gambrill (I912) i75 Ill. App. 641. Thus, courts have held
that general payment on account of a greater debt, unaccompanied by any quali-
fying act, removes the statutory bar. Foster v. Starkey (1853, Mass.) 12 Cush.
324; Barron v. Kennedy (186i) i7 Calif. 574. But in the instant case there
was no general payment on the entire note-rather a special payment in full of
the specific part due X. It seems impossible to imply from this action any
acknowledgment of a greater debt'or any promise to pay Y. See A'Court v.
Cross (I825, C. P.) 3 Bing. 329. Thus the decision in the instant case is to
be commended, although the reasoning of the court may be open to question.
The so-called joint obligation is not necessarily of such an indivisible nature
that payment to one obligor of his share must revive the obligation as to the
other. See Park v. Parker (914) 216 Mass. 405, io3 N. E. 936; Williams v.
Jones (I92I) 175 Wis. 380, I85 N. W. 231 (payees of joint note said to hold
as tenants in common). The exact question here involved seems never to have
been presented before.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-CONSTITUTIONAL LAw--ZoNING ORDINANCES.-
The plaintiff owned property in a district designated for residence only by a
comprehensive zoning ordinance. He opened a tailor shop on the premises with-
out a permit and was arrested for violation of the ordinance. On being refused
a permit by the defendant as inspector of buildings, he petitioned for a writ of
mandamus directing the defendant to issue the permit. An agreed statement of
facts brought in issue the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance, and a ver-
dict was given for the defendant. Plaintiff appealed. Held, (two judges dis-
senting) that the cause be reversed for further proceedings to determine whether
plaintiff had complied with all the requirements for a permit; but that the
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"use" provisions of the zoning ordinance were unconstitutional. Goldman v
Crowther (1925, Md.) 128 Atl. So.
It is regretted that the court did not follow the authorities sustaining this type
of valuable social engineering. See Williams, The Law of City Planning and
Zoning (922) 284; COMMENTS (923) 32 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 833; NOTES
(1924) 24 COL. L. REv. 64o; Chamberlain and Pierson, Zoning Laws and Ordi-
nances (1924) io A. B. A. JouR. i85, 245; Bettman, Constitutionality of Zoning(924) 37 HARV. L. REv. 834- For general discussions on zoning laws and city
planning, see Nolen, City Planning (1922) passim; Williams, op. cit. supra;(I925) 54 Survey Graphic, No. 3.
PERSONS-DuTY OF PUTATIVE PARENTS TO SUPPORT CHILD--ENFRCEMENT OF
CONTRACT BY CHILD.-The plaintiff, the illegitimate son of the defendant, sued
to enforce an agreement under seal betwen the defendant and his mother, whereby
the defendant promised to pay her a monthly allowance, with express pro-
vision that a certain portion of it should go to the plaintiff's guardian. Later,
the mother released the defendant in consideration of $5,ooo. The trial court
held that this was a contract primarily for the benefit of the plaintiff, and that
it gave him an interest which could not be destroyed by the release of the
mother. Held, that the judgment be affirmed. Brill v. Brill (925, Pa.) 127
Aft. 84o.
The decision seems proper on contractural grounds. Tweedale v. Tweedale(I9O3) 116 Wis. 517, 93 N. W. 44o (promisee has no power of release even
before third party beneficiary knows of contract); Roberts, v. Northwestern
National Life Ins. Co. (915) i43 Ga. 780, 85 S. E. io43. And illustrates
another desirable method of enforcing the father's imperfect duty to support
a child, generally said to be unenforceable at the suit of the child. Huke v.
Huke (i891) 44 Mo. App, 308 (legitimate) contra: Sanders v. Sanders (1914)
167 N. C. 319, 83 S. E. 49o (illegitimate) ; Doughty v. Engler (923) 112 Kan.
583, 211 Pac. 6i9 (same); see generally, COMMENTS (1923) 32 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 825.
WILLS-ALTERATIONS-MATERIAL INTERLINEATINs.-The court was unable to
determine whether certain material interlineations on the face of the will h ad
been made before or after attestation. Held, that probate be refused the whole.
instrument. In re Hamlin's Will (i925, Surro. Ct.) :o8 N. Y. Supp. 799.
Since the burden of proof is on the proponent to show proper attestation, in
case of alterations he must show that they were made before execution. Wilton
v. Humphrey (i9oo) 176 Mass. 253, 57 N. E. 374; see Ward v. Wilcox (I9Om)
64 N. J. Eq. 303, 51 Ati. io94. As this proof was wanting in the instant case,
the decision is sound in refusing probate to the interlineations, but seems out of
line with most cases in rejecting the rest of the will. Matter of Gibson (I9O8)
128 App. Div. 769, 113 N. Y. Supp. 266; In re Swartz (1913) 79 Misc. 388,
139 N. Y. Supp. 11o5; see Hill v. Burger (1854, N. Y.) io How. 264, 269.
